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Nationalism & International Order: Two Ideal-Types

In my dissertation Claiming the Nation: Coalition Networks and Nationalist Mobilization in the Short Nineteenth Century, 1830-1848, I examined how the proliferation of nationalist rhetoric among mid-nineteenth century British and Prussian elites shaped the foreign policy orientation of the state and impacted established forms of international relations and order.

 

My findings suggest that nationalism per se does not constitute a disruptive or revisionist force into international politics--a prevalent assumption in mainstream IR scholarship. Rather, I suggest the key for understanding its impact lies in unpacking the discursive and political dynamics of nationalist mobilization, including the way elites use nationalist language to bind specific constituent groups to their coalition. Crucially, I suggest that elites can influence the social basis of their coalition by choosing which groups they target in the process.

 

To capture this dynamic, I identify two-ideal types of nationalist mobilization strategies. The first, nationalist convergence, seeks to form a “big-tent” coalition of established factions through political compromise and gradual refrom, while excluding more marginal elements of the electorate. In contrast, nationalist radicalization eschews cooperation and compromise in favor of a strategy that focuses on the mobilization of more radical voices and previously depoliticized groups in the electorate.

Using relational-network analysis, I go on to argue that differences in coalition type explain why nationalism can have a variety of effects on international relations. Coalitions brokered through nationalist convergence tend to mobilize constituents invested in the political status quo and are thus unlikely to pose a fundamental challenge to established patterns of domestic and international order.

The transgressive nature of nationalist radicalization, however, is designed to channel support from groups that reject established political routines and structures. When these groups gain status within a coalition, they can force leaders to promote a more belligerent foreign policy that meets their core demand for a new expression of national identity. In summary, my research suggests that the rhetorical maneuvers leaders choose to mobilize the public (and the political bargains these produce) can constrain the policy maneuverability of a state considerably. Nationalism, it follows, is what political elites make of it.

I provide empirical evidence for my theoretical framework through a discursive analysis of primary documents, including parliamentary speeches and diplomatic correspondence among  British and Prussian elites between 1820 and 1848.  I then use process-tracing to examine how these rhetorical choices constrained policymakers during several diplomatic and international crisis in the 1830s and 1840s, including the Greek War of Independence, the Belgian Revolt and the First Schleswig-Holstein War.

I am currently in the process of expanding this research into a book manuscript. I am also working on several article-length projects that build on the theoretical and empirical findings of my dissertation, including how we should re-envision the role of nationalism and the power of nationalist narrative in IR scholarship more generally.

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